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NORM CHANGE OR JUDICIAL DECREE? THE
COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND WELFARE REFORM
AMY L. WAX*

The topic for this panel—the relationship between commu‐
nity values and judicial decision making—calls to mind Su‐
preme Court cases on high‐profile issues that have provoked
strong criticism from the public. Decisions regarding church‐
state relations,1 abortion,2 free speech,3 government regulation
of property rights,4 and affirmative action5 are recent examples.
This Essay addresses another example of tension between judi‐
cial decrees and popular attitudes. From the 1960s through the
1980s, key Supreme Court decisions addressing the administra‐
tion of public welfare programs were at odds with the domi‐
nant values of much of the nation. For a number of reasons,
that conflict has now largely been resolved. Therein lies a re‐
vealing story.
In 1996, after decades of experimental and pilot programs,
Congress enacted a massive overhaul of the federal poverty‐
relief scheme. As part of a comprehensive welfare reform pack‐
age sponsored by the Clinton Administration, the core federal
cash‐aid program, Aid for Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), was repealed and replaced with a work‐based assis‐
tance program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
* Robert Mundheim Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004); Zelman
v. Simmons‐Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002); Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001).
2. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2775 (2008); Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.
Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.,
547 U.S. 47, 70 (2006).
4. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2746 (2007); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003).
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(TANF).6 These changes coincided with a significant decline in
the role of the courts in shaping policy in the welfare area. Al‐
though the federal courts considered a range of important chal‐
lenges to laws and regulations governing poverty relief and
economic redistribution between the 1960s and the mid‐1980s,
they have been relatively uninvolved since that period and
have not played a major role in sorting out issues arising from
the welfare reform legislation. Moreover, despite widespread
attention to growing economic and social inequality,7 there is
no evidence of a significant push to reenlist courts in efforts to
address these problems. A visit to informational and advocacy
websites on poverty issues bears out this abandonment of judi‐
cial avenues.8 All told, there is little reason to believe that
courts will significantly shape the law and policy of poor relief
in the near future.
This picture represents a significant change. In the 1960s and
1970s, welfare‐rights advocates were eager to use the courts to
advance their agenda. Their main priorities at that time in‐
cluded establishing economic rights and invalidating restrictive
conditions on entitlement to welfare benefits.9 Poverty law
courses began to appear in law school curricula around the
country, and instructors became handmaidens of the activist
welfare project.10 The goal was to teach students how to litigate on
behalf of the poor by arguing for expanded access to public assis‐
tance. On the theory that existing benefit conditions enshrined the
race and class prejudices of a benighted majority, liberalizing

6. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104‐193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 & 42 U.S.C.).
7. See, e.g., Michael Kazin & Julian E. Zelizer, A New Social Contract, WASH. POST,
June 22, 2008, at B7; Alexander Stille, Grounded by an Income Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 2001, at A17. See generally ARLOC SHERMAN & AVIVA ARON‐DINE, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, NEW CBO DATA SHOW INCOME INEQUALITY CON‐
TINUES TO WIDEN: AFTER‐TAX‐INCOME FOR TOP 1 PERCENT ROSE BY $146,000 IN
2004 (2007), http://www.cbpp.org/1‐23‐07inc.htm; Amy L. Wax, Engines of Inequal‐
ity: Class, Race, and Family Structure, 41 FAM. L.Q. 567, 588 (2007).
8. See, e.g., Public Agenda Issue Guide: Poverty and Welfare, http://www.
publicagenda.org/citizen/issueguides/poverty‐and‐welfare/sources‐and‐resources
(last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
9. See R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS
83–84 (1994).
10. See Amy L. Wax, Musical Chairs and Tall Buildings: Teaching Poverty Law in the
21st Century, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1363, 1364 (2007).
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poverty relief was regarded as an important rights‐expanding
project in keeping with a broader civil rights agenda.11 As dis‐
cussed more fully below, the results were decidedly mixed, with
activists scoring some key victories while failing to achieve their
broader goal of securely establishing positive economic rights.
Law students today are only dimly aware of the landmark
decisions in the welfare area that received widespread atten‐
tion at the time they were decided. Because issues surrounding
public assistance do not currently preoccupy the courts, these
earlier decisions are viewed as historical relics with little ongo‐
ing significance. That view is overly simplistic. Although the
controversies surrounding the Supreme Court’s welfare‐rights
decisions have largely abated, the trajectory of the courts’ in‐
volvement in these issues sheds important light on the inter‐
play between community norms and judicial decrees.
The courts’ declining role in shaping the direction of social
welfare law and policy is best understood as the culmination of
a decades‐long tug‐of‐war between community values—as ex‐
pressed through legislative restrictions on poor relief pro‐
grams—and the Supreme Court’s vision of the proper ambit for
those values in setting poor relief policies. The role of the
courts has now abated because of two signal developments in
the social and legal landscape. First, recent revisions in the ba‐
sic New Deal scheme for federal poverty programs have
largely corrected one source of popular discontent in the ad‐
ministration of welfare programs—the unfairness and perverse
incentives flowing from the failure to require recipients to
work. To the extent that these revisions have been challenged
at all, the courts have largely upheld the imposition of strict
work requirements. Second, sexual mores have shifted dra‐
matically. They are now far more in sync with the decades‐old
(and originally unpopular) decisions invalidating benefits re‐
strictions tied to unconventional sexual conduct and nontradi‐
tional families. Although the government has not given up on
trying to support—and revive—the traditional nuclear family, it
has largely abandoned the direct use of welfare law and policy
to regulate, punish, or reward private reproductive behavior.
Recounting this story requires some historical background.
The New Deal ushered in an important sea change in our coun‐
11. See id.
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try’s approach toward the poor. Until the 1930s, poverty relief
was principally a local charge.12 Modest antipoverty programs,
such as aid for widowed mothers, were funded and adminis‐
tered largely at the state or municipal level.13 As part of a com‐
prehensive series of New Deal reforms that included both so‐
cial insurance and direct subsidies, Congress established the
Aid to Dependent Children Program, which eventually became
Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Congress
designed the program, which the states administered, to sup‐
port families with children left destitute by the death or aban‐
donment of a parent (usually the father). The stated goal was to
relieve mothers in those families of the need to work, thus leav‐
ing them free to care for their children.14
Although AFDC was initially a small and uncontroversial
program, its popularity declined as the number of recipients
grew and the beneficiary population changed. At first, recipi‐
ents were mostly widows and divorcees.15 After 1960, a bur‐
geoning population of never‐married single mothers and their
out‐of‐wedlock children replaced those earlier recipients.16 Al‐
though nonwhites rarely received benefits during the first dec‐
ades of the program, the number of black single mothers on
welfare expanded and became a significant part of the welfare
population.17 Community outreach programs spearheaded by
welfare‐rights advocates helped swell the rolls. These develop‐
ments engendered concerns that AFDC encouraged dependency,
undermined the traditional family, and fueled the growth of an

12. For a discussion on the transition from state provision of welfare to federal
provision, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the
Implications of Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behaviour, 58 U.
TORONTO L.J. 241, 247–48 (2008).
13. See MELNICK, supra note 9, at 65; FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD,
REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 46–48 (2d ed. 1993).
14. See JEFF GROGER & LYNN A. KAROLY, WELFARE REFORM: EFFECTS OF A DEC‐
ADE OF CHANGE 10–11 (2005).
15. See Susan W. Blank & Barbara B. Blum, A Brief History of Work Expectations
for Welfare Mothers, 7 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 28, 29–30 (1997); June Carbone,
Age Matters: Class, Family Formation, and Inequality, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 901,
936–37 (2008).
16. For a more statistically detailed discussion of this transition, see Carbone,
supra note 15, at 936–37.
17. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End Justify the
Means?, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 243, 248 (2001).
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urban, black, underclass culture.18 Dissatisfaction with a growing,
idle welfare population became a salient political issue, fueling
the rise of the Republican Party in the 1970s and beyond.19
Throughout this period, the AFDC program was intermit‐
tently revised to introduce limited training and work require‐
ments, but insufficient funding and the absence of political will
prevented these innovations from being implemented effec‐
tively.20 For most single mothers with children, especially in ur‐
ban areas, welfare benefits were easily obtained and appeared to
continue indefinitely. For more and more recipients, welfare did
indeed become “a way of life.”21
The groundswell of popular concern grew slowly from the
1970s through the 1990s, finally culminating in decisive politi‐
cal action. The 1996 welfare reform legislation, TANF, intro‐
duced three key changes in the federal scheme of poverty re‐
lief. First, it significantly expanded states’ discretion in doling
out benefits, allowing greater ambit for innovative programs,
conditions, and restrictions. Second, it imposed substantial
work requirements for adults—including single mothers—as a
condition of receiving aid. Third, it established a strict five‐year
limit on benefits for most recipient families.22
What role have the courts played in these historical devel‐
opments? Assessing the courts’ contribution to the current state
of welfare law and policy requires some understanding of the
core principles that govern the politics of poverty relief in this
country. As Martin Gilens has documented, public opinion on
the optimal design of public welfare programs has long em‐
18. See Theodore H. White, Summing Up, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1982, § 6 (Maga‐
zine), at 32. For a recounting of early 1970s welfare reform efforts, see Robert B.
Carleson, Real welfare reform: More responsibility to the states, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 18,
2005, at A19.
19. See E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS 93–94 (1991).
20. See Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Chil‐
dren: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
457, 489–94 (1988).
21. For a well‐known critique of welfare as “a way of life,” see Gov. William J.
Clinton, I Still Believe in a Place Called Hope, Acceptance Speech at the Democ‐
ratic National Convention (July 16, 1992), in L.A. TIMES, July 17, 1992, at 10.
22. See Amy L. Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 477,
487 (2001). Although TANF made cash relief harder to obtain, it left relatively
untouched other aspects of the safety net for poor families. TANF benefits contin‐
ued to be supplemented by a range of federal programs and transfers, including
food stamps, housing subsidies, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Medicaid.
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braced the distinction between the deserving and undeserving
poor.23 These categories roughly track the so‐called luck egali‐
tarian divide between those who suffer deprivation through
bad luck or forces outside their control and those whose pov‐
erty can be traced in large part to their own imprudent
choices.24 Although voters are generally skeptical of govern‐
ment‐sponsored handouts, they are willing to help people
down on their luck. That is, they support assisting people who
are victims of misfortune, but are reluctant to bail out those
perceived as behaving irresponsibly. In defining who is irre‐
sponsible and who is merely unlucky, voters have consistently
embraced something of an ethos of conditional reciprocity for
public welfare. They robustly endorse fundamental norms of
self‐reliance, and believe that able‐bodied persons should strive
to minimize their economic dependency.25
Historically, the distinction between bad luck and bad choices
influenced transfer policies in two important ways. First, welfare
rules were structured to take account of beneficiaries’ behav‐
ior—including their sexual conduct—as it affected their eco‐
nomic need and dependency. At the time of AFDC’s enactment,
sexual relations out of wedlock were viewed with disapproval.
The public was well aware that such relationships often pro‐
duced children and mothers who were destined to become de‐
pendent on public assistance. Women who had sexual relations
and gave birth to children outside of marriage, without the cus‐
tomary support of the male provider, were viewed as acting
irresponsibly. Likewise, men’s choices to engage in extramari‐
tal liaisons, while failing to marry or to provide support for re‐
sulting children, engendered public resentment. During the
initial decades after AFDC’s enactment, mothers were not ex‐
pected to work, but men were expected to support their fami‐
23. See MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE
THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 92–93 (1999).

WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND

24. See Amy L. Wax, Something for Nothing: Liberal Justice and Welfare Work Re‐
quirements, 52 EMORY L.J. 1, 20–29 (2003). For more on luck egalitarianism, see
Daniel Markovits, Luck Egalitarianism and Political Solidarity, 9 THEORETICAL IN‐
QUIRIES L. 271 (2008).
25. For a defense of this view, see Amy L. Wax, Social Welfare, Human Dignity,
and the Puzzle of What We Owe Each Other, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 121 (2003)
[hereinafter Wax, Social Welfare], and Amy L. Wax, The Political Psychology of Redis‐
tribution: Implications for Welfare Reform, in WELFARE REFORM AND POLITICAL THE‐
ORY 200–22 (Lawrence M. Mead & Christopher Beem eds., 2005).
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lies. This scheme gave rise to concern with men’s idleness, fail‐
ure to engage in gainful employment, and refusal to take on the
breadwinner role. In more recent decades, as women entered
the labor force in increasing numbers, these concerns were
gradually extended to women as well.26
The voting majority’s embrace of traditional norms of self‐
sufficiency, family obligation, sexual restraint, and responsible
personal conduct contrasted sharply with the agenda of welfare‐
rights advocates in the 1960s and 1970s. That agenda received
support from elements of elite opinion and from legal scholars
concerned with poverty. Then, as today, welfare advocates
were unrelentingly hostile to the deserving‐undeserving dis‐
tinction, with special animosity reserved for welfare restric‐
tions based on individual sexual conduct and reproductive
choices.27 On this point, activists drew strength from liberal po‐
litical theorists’ contemporaneous attack on the very concept of
desert.28 On this view, individual conduct is not and should not
be morally or legally relevant to the provision of public aid—or
to desert more generally—at least in matters surrounding eco‐
nomic life.29 But even if some people deserve their fate, the poor
almost always do not. The poor are rarely undeserving, because
they are trapped by social and economic conditions. Thus, the
notion that society’s disadvantaged could and should do more
to support themselves is misguided and delusory.30 As victims
of a structurally unjust system, the poor should not be deprived
of governmental aid by the imposition of stringent or conduct‐
26. See discussion infra.
27. See Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?”: Reflections on the
Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centu‐
ries, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 221–24 (2002) (discussing the use of sexual
norms to distinguish the “deserving” from the “undeserving”); Richard Hardack,
Bad Faith: Race, Religion and the Reformation of Welfare Law, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 539, 616 (2006) (arguing that “deserving poor,” for purposes of
AFDC, meant in practice “the sexually ascetic, monogamous, frugal, tidy, and
white” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Dorothy A.
Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 810–16 (2007)
(arguing that the deserving‐undeserving distinction is race and class based).
28. But see Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Le‐
gal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965) (arguing that the concept of desert entitles
the poor to public assistance).
29. See Samuel Scheffler, Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 965,
985–86 (2000).
30. See Amy L. Wax, The failure of welfare reform, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006, at M3
[hereinafter Wax, The failure of welfare reform]. See generally Wax, supra note 24.
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related conditions. To the extent that popular attitudes reject this
view, they are unsophisticated at best and bigoted at worst.
What role did the courts play in mediating between these
contrasting views of the proper scope of public largesse? In the
1960s and 1970s, during the heyday of the welfare‐rights
movement, the courts regularly ruled on challenges to official
attempts to shape benefit eligibility requirements to respect tra‐
ditional mores of sexual and financial responsibility. Although
the Supreme Court was largely sympathetic to these chal‐
lenges, the landscape is somewhat mixed. In rejecting some
conditional benefits restrictions, the Supreme Court issued a
few key opinions that placed it distinctly at odds with domi‐
nant notions of deservingness. In other cases, however, it up‐
held restrictions consonant with popular views.
The most controversial cases concerned restrictions placed
on eligibility for AFDC benefits. Under the terms of the federal
statute governing these benefits, states were to make cash aid
available to families with an “absent parent,” with no express
exclusion for single, unmarried mothers. But the dominant
norms of the time made many states reluctant to pay benefits to
unmarried mothers cohabiting with men who took no respon‐
sibility for them or their children. Not only were the women
(and men) involved in such relationships considered undeserv‐
ing, but eligibility for single mothers under these circumstances
was viewed as unfair and corrosive of public morals.31 Such
benefits undermined marriage by “subsidizing” illicit relation‐
ships and flouting accepted conventions of family self‐
sufficiency. Concern was also directed at the potential horizon‐
tal inequity between welfare beneficiaries and conventional
families, who were ineligible for benefits under the terms of the
program. Aid programs without conduct restrictions were seen
as putting poor married couples at a disadvantage compared to
single mothers.
A number of states responded to these concerns by develop‐
ing rules designed to deny benefits to cohabiting single moth‐
ers. A 1968 case, King v. Smith,32 challenged Alabama’s use of
31. See Jill Duerr Berrick, From Mother’s Duty to Personal Responsibility: The Evolu‐
tion of AFDC, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 257, 260–61 (1996); Amy Mulzer, The Door‐
keeper and the Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of Verification Procedures in Means‐
Tested Welfare Programs, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 663, 667–69 (2005).
32. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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its administrative discretion under the AFDC program to ex‐
clude families consisting of unmarried mothers who were liv‐
ing with or maintaining sexual relationships with men. Under
the Alabama rule, any man engaged in a relationship with an
eligible mother was deemed a “substitute father” under the
statute, thus defeating the statutory requirement of an “absent
parent.”33 Alabama maintained that the “substitute father” in‐
terpretation was necessary to discourage illicit relationships
and illegitimate births and to put couples involved in informal
sexual relationships on a par with married couple families.34
Likewise, in Lewis v. Martin,35 California sought to exclude
unmarried cohabiting women from the AFDC program by
deeming available, for purposes of calculating benefits eligibil‐
ity, the earnings of any unrelated adult male present in a single
mother’s home. This regulation, which designated the single
woman’s male partner a “man assuming the role of a spouse”
or “MARS” under the pertinent regulations, effectively as‐
signed him financial responsibility for the woman’s family unit
for purposes of welfare entitlement.36 Again, this regulation was
intended to discourage illicit conduct and out‐of‐wedlock births
and to establish horizontal equity with poor married couple
families who were ineligible to receive benefits under AFDC.
In both cases, the restrictions imposed by the states meant that
some children of cohabiting or sexually active single mothers
were deprived of benefits regardless of whether the mothers’
male partners were actually their fathers, actually contributed to
their support, or were legally required to do so. In both cases,
the Supreme Court struck down the state regulations. In King v.
Smith, the Court ruled that the Alabama substitute‐father rule
was inconsistent with the federal statute creating the AFDC
program.37 Relying on what it identified as the core purpose of
the AFDC statute—to support needy children—the Court
noted that the mothers’ sexual conduct had no bearing on the
existence of the children’s need.38 Therefore, conditioning bene‐
33. For a discussion on “substitute parent” state laws, see WINIFRED BELL, AID
76–92 (1965).
34. See King, 392 U.S. at 318.
35. 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
36. See id. at 554.
37. King, 392 U.S. at 326–27.
38. See id. at 320.

TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN
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fits on the mothers’ behavior was inconsistent with the statute’s
objective. Enforcing public morality or satisfying the state’s
sense of fairness to intact families and married fathers could
not be allowed to interfere with this goal.39 In the same vein,
the Court in Lewis v. Martin ruled that California was not al‐
lowed to assume that a man’s income was available to support
a mother and her children unless state law obligated that man
to provide support.40 In California, a male who was neither
married to a woman nor the legally established father of her
children had no such obligation. Therefore, the income of a
man who did not meet these conditions could not be assumed
available under the federal statute for purposes of determining
eligibility for aid.41
In a similar case decided shortly after, United States Depart‐
ment of Agriculture v. Moreno,42 the Supreme Court considered a
challenge to Congress’s decision to amend federal law to dis‐
qualify households consisting of unrelated individuals from
eligibility for food stamps. Although the legislative record sug‐
gested that this provision was motivated by Congress’s disap‐
proval of and reluctance to subsidize “hippie communes,” the
government did not rely on this rationale in defending the pro‐
vision at issue.43 Rather, the government argued that the meas‐
ure was necessary to minimize fraudulent claims for food
stamps.44 Striking down the amendment as constitutionally
impermissible, the Court in Moreno characterized the restriction
on household composition as irrational and arbitrary in light of
the core purpose of the food stamp program, which was to en‐
sure an adequate supply of food for individuals unable to af‐
ford proper nutrition.45 Disregarding Congress’s stated concern

39. See id. at 325 (“In sum, Congress has determined that immorality and ille‐
gitimacy should be dealt with through rehabilitative measures rather than meas‐
ures that punish dependent children, and that protection of such children is the
paramount goal of AFDC.”).
40. See Lewis, 397 U.S. at 556–57 (“[T]he regulations explicitly negate the idea
that in determining a child’s needs, a stepfather . . . or a[n] [adult male person
assuming the role of spouse to the mother although not legally married to her]
may be presumed to be providing support.”).
41. See id. at 559–60.
42. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
43. See id. at 537–38.
44. See id. at 535.
45. See id. at 538.
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with the unconventional sexual arrangements in some house‐
holds, the Court characterized Congress’s goal of excluding hip‐
pie communes as motivated by pure animus or the bare desire to
harm an unpopular group.46 The Court ruled that this desire did
not advance a valid public purpose, especially in light of the food
stamp program’s avowed aim of feeding the hungry.47
These three cases stand in contrast to others, decided within
the same period, in which the Supreme Court upheld condi‐
tions on benefits designed to reinforce—or at least to avoid un‐
dermining—widely held expectations of self‐sufficiency and
sexual conduct. In Dandridge v. Williams,48 for example, welfare
recipients challenged Maryland’s decision not to pay higher
AFDC benefits to families with more than a designated number
of children. The State sought to justify the benefits ceiling as a
means to maximize the number of families supported with lim‐
ited resources. The State also pointed to the goals of fairness to
non‐beneficiary working families, who did not automatically
get a raise upon the birth of each child. It also sought to en‐
courage employment by ensuring that single‐mother families
on welfare did not possess more resources than low‐income
working families. The Supreme Court upheld the Maryland
benefits schedule, accepting the State’s justifications for the cap
as consistent with the objectives of the AFDC program and
grounded in the realities of family life.49
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Califano v. Boles,50 upheld a
regulation under the Social Security program that distin‐
guished between married and unmarried mothers of insured
wage earners’ children. Under the terms of the Social Security
Act, dependent relatives of deceased qualifying wage earners

46. See id. at 534.
47. See id. at 535–36.
48. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
49. The Court acknowledged Maryland’s “legitimate interest in encouraging
employment and in avoiding discrimination between welfare families and the
families of the working poor.” It further explained that “[b]y combining a limit on
the recipient’s grant with permission to retain money earned, without reduction
in the amount of the grant, Maryland provides an incentive to seek gainful em‐
ployment. And by keying the maximum family AFDC grants to the minimum
wage a steadily employed head of a household receives, the State maintains some
semblance of an equitable balance between families on welfare and those sup‐
ported by an employed breadwinner.” Id. at 486.
50. 443 U.S. 282 (1979).
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are entitled to survivors’ benefits, including a special allotment
for the widowed mothers of workers’ minor children. In Boles,
the Court considered the claim that restricting these so‐called
“mothers’ insurance benefits” to widows and divorced wives,
while denying payments to unmarried mothers of the wage
earner’s biological children, was an unconstitutional violation
of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.51
In rejecting that claim, the Court reasoned that the statutory
distinction was based on the reasonable general assumption
that a wage earner’s widow or former wife was more likely
than an unmarried consort to have been dependent on the
wage earner during his lifetime and to suffer economic disloca‐
tion upon his death.52 The Court also denied that the rule
unlawfully discriminated against children born out of wedlock,
noting that those children were entitled to separate benefits
under specified conditions.53 Although relying principally on
the validity of legislative generalizations about the economic
significance of marriage, the Court’s decision in Boles had the
effect of reinforcing conventional expectations and norms re‐
garding sexual behavior and family. By preserving the priority
of marriage over extramarital liaisons through ensuring more
favorable treatment to a wage earner’s lawfully wedded wife
(and her children) than to his girlfriend (and her children), the
provision rewarded and encouraged marital relationships.
The rules and restrictions at issue in these cases reflect tradi‐
tional notions regarding sexuality, family relations, and economic
obligation. In each case, public officials responsible for creating
and administering public welfare programs were loathe to offer
financial support—which could be viewed as a form of public
subsidy—for behavior that ran afoul of customary expectations.
The rules were also designed to achieve fairness toward those
who, to paraphrase President Clinton’s more recent formulation,
“work hard and play by the rules.”54 On this view, programs to
help the poor must be structured to ensure that welfare recipi‐
ents are no better off than other low‐income persons who man‐
age, by virtue of their own effort and restraint, to avoid depend‐
51. See id. at 295–96.
52. See id. at 289.
53. See id. at 294–95.
54. The President’s Radio Address, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 31, 32 (Jan.
7, 1995).
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age, by virtue of their own effort and restraint, to avoid depend‐
ency. Individuals who are working, getting married, and paying
taxes to support others deserve more favorable treatment than
those on the public dole.55
Thus, what seemed to incense the architects of the “substi‐
tute father” and “man in the house” rules at issue in cases like
King v. Smith and Lewis v. Martin was the prospect of single
mothers on welfare enjoying no‐strings‐attached sexual rela‐
tionships with men who bore no responsibility for the women’s
children and were heedless of the fate of any children they
might conceive. Meanwhile, living right next door were hard‐
working married couples with no greater advantages or skills
who, nonetheless, were not receiving aid. The decision of those
neighbors to marry, and the steps the men in those families
took to support their wives and children, rendered most of
these families ineligible for welfare benefits under the terms of
AFDC, which was designed primarily to assist children with
“absent parents.” In formulating the restrictions at issue, the
states were clearly acknowledging the deserving neighbors of
welfare recipients and seeking to mute or eliminate the perver‐
sity of denying aid to traditional families while supplying cash
to people who disregarded conventional moral expectations
and strictures. Not only were such efforts viewed as serving
principles of fairness, but they were also seen as reducing the
temptation to fall into dependency.
In turning back the effort to minimize the perversity of
AFDC, the Court’s primary motive seems to have been avoid‐
ing harm to poor dependent children; that is, it tried to refrain
from visiting the sins of the parents upon the sons. The Su‐
preme Court had relied on this principle in a series of contempo‐
raneous decisions repudiating longstanding state rules that put
illegitimate children at a disadvantage relative to children born
in wedlock.56 Applying this principle in the Court’s decisions on
welfare, however, produced perverse results. By enshrining
55. The principle that best captures this idea is that of avoiding perversity in the
design of public welfare programs. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF
REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY 27–42 (1991) (suggesting that conser‐
vative opposition to welfare programs is often grounded in a concern with such
programs’ perverse effects, including creating undesirable incentives and reward‐
ing antisocial behavior).
56. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70–72 (1968). In the welfare context,
see N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973).
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duct, the rulings undermined states’ efforts to preserve equity in
the treatment of welfare recipients and working families.
In the wake of these decisions, Congress and the States got
the message: Heavy‐handed attempts to use conditions on pub‐
lic benefits to enforce dominant norms surrounding family life,
sexuality, and economic dependency were off‐limits. The States
were now constrained in their attempts to incorporate conduct‐
based rules reflecting popular conceptions of deserving and
undeserving behavior. After King v. Smith, Lewis v. Martin, and
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, political actors
at the state and federal level were forced to back away from
official efforts to “legislate morality” through conditions on
public welfare.57
The fallout from the Court’s decisions, however, was not lost
on the voters. The abandonment of the twin goals of non‐
perversity, which were to preserve the favored position for
those who respected conventional mores and to eliminate in‐
centives for bad behavior, was politically ill‐timed. Taxpayers
resented the liberalization of welfare disbursements, and their
ire was fueled by simultaneous explosions in crime, welfare
dependency, and extramarital childbearing.58 These develop‐
ments had important political consequences. The growing un‐
popularity of the AFDC program worked to the advantage of
the Republican Party and contributed to the success of Republi‐
can Presidential candidates Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan,
who made taming the excesses of the welfare system a priority.59
The backlash was heard in Bill Clinton’s promise to “end welfare
as we know it,” which helped get him elected and produced the
significant reforms enacted during his Administration.60

57. But see J.L. Mashaw, Welfare Reform and Local Administration of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REV. 818 (1971) (documenting contin‐
ued informal efforts to distinguish between deserving and undeserving recipients
of AFDC, and to maintain equity between working and welfare families, by ad‐
ministrators of welfare programs in various counties in Virginia).
58. See Susan Chira, War Over Role of American Fathers, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1994,
at A22; Steven A. Holmes, Out‐of‐Wedlock Births Up Since ’83, Report Indicates, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 1994, at A1.
59. See ALONZO L. HAMBY, LIBERALISM AND ITS CHALLENGERS: FROM F.D.R. TO
BUSH 319–29, 359 (2d ed. 1992).
60. See Francis X. Clines, Clinton Signs Bill Cutting Welfare; States in New Role,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at A1.
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Nonetheless, the Court’s influence on the trajectory of wel‐
fare law and policy and on the politics surrounding welfare
reform should not be overstated. The pro‐welfare decisions de‐
tailed above, although receiving widespread attention and un‐
deniably shaping the course of poor relief, are only part of the
story. Other developments, both in the courts and in society as
a whole, have influenced the evolution of government benefits
programs and attitudes towards the disadvantaged more gen‐
erally. First, as already discussed, the Supreme Court’s antipa‐
thy towards state‐initiated measures designed to temper the
perverse incentives and morally unconventional features of
welfare programs began to ease. The Court in Dandridge v. Wil‐
liams allowed the state to cap benefits in deference to conven‐
tional concerns about the unfairness of escalated payments to
welfare recipients that were unavailable to working families.
Similarly, the Court in Califano v. Boles refused to require the
Social Security program to put a man’s mistress on a par with
his wife. By effectively deferring to prevailing norms, these
outcomes helped temper political discontent.
Second, even during the heyday of welfare rights, the courts
did not go nearly as far as they could have. Nor did they em‐
brace the core agenda of welfare activists. Judges consistently
refused to recognize a fundamental right to economic support
and repeatedly asserted that the legislative decision to grant
government largesse is a discretionary one.61 In San Antonio In‐
dependent School District v. Rodriguez,62 for example, the Su‐
preme Court decisively turned back an attempt to declare the
poor a constitutionally suspect class, which would have trig‐
gered strict scrutiny for legislative distinctions based on eco‐
nomic status.63 The Court’s refusal to recognize positive rights
to economic support, or to view the poor as a special protected
class, preserved some degree of leeway for Congress and the
States to structure benefits to achieve desirable social goals.
In the wake of these rulings, the lower courts have selectively
permitted attempts to tailor aid programs to create work incen‐
61. For a discussion and historical overview, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND
BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE
THAN EVER 149–71 (2004).
62. 411 U.S. 1, 6 (1973).
63. See id. (reversing a lower court’s ruling that the Texas school finance system
was unconstitutional).
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tives, preserve fiscal integrity, shore up intact families, encour‐
age law‐abiding behavior, and serve other popular goals. Un‐
der TANF, for example, the courts have recently upheld restric‐
tions on benefits based on past conduct, criminality, and
immigration status. These restrictions include provisions bar‐
ring persons convicted of certain drug‐related felonies from
receiving aid under the federal food stamp or TANF pro‐
grams.64 Courts have also allowed states to cap the amount of
welfare payments to single mothers who continue to bear chil‐
dren out of wedlock.65 Finally, judges have given Congress, the
States, and welfare agencies broad leeway to structure pro‐
grams to advance the core goal of encouraging work. Few legal
challenges to work requirements under TANF have been un‐
dertaken, and none of importance has succeeded.66
There is no question that the Supreme Court’s refusal to al‐
low states and administrators to “legislate morality” seriously
restricted the political options for dealing with what was per‐
ceived in some quarters as the socially destructive excesses of
poverty relief programs. Nonetheless, this account of the rela‐
tionship between the courts and the community on matters re‐
lated to public welfare is seriously incomplete. This is because
the morality that voters—and their representatives—are inter‐
ested in legislating has evolved radically over time. When the
most important welfare cases were decided, most people em‐
braced fairly conservative values on sexuality, family structure,
and dependency. When poverty relief and social insurance pro‐
grams were forged in mid‐century, most mothers were not in
the workforce.67 Women were, however, expected to control
their sexuality in ways that would minimize their own and

64. See 21 U.S.C. § 862(a), (d); Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419 (7th Cir. 2000)
(finding Section 862(a) to be “rationally related to legitimate government interests
in deterring drug use and reducing welfare fraud”).
65. See, e.g., C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D.N.J. 1995), aff’d sub nom.,
C.K. v. N.J. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 195 (3d Cir. 1996).
66. For a review of some of the issues involved in work requirements imposed
on recipients of benefits under TANF, see Matthew Diller, Working Without a Job:
The Social Messages of the New Workfare, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 19, 23–25 (1998),
reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: AN ANTI‐ESSENTIALIST READER 151, 152–54
(Nancy E. Dowd & Michelle S. Jacobs eds., 2003).
67. See Martin H. Malin, Unemployment Compensation in a Time of Increasing Work‐
Family Conflicts, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 131, 133 (1995–96).
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their children’s dependency.68 Specifically, they were expected
to avoid conduct that posed the risk of their becoming economi‐
cally dependent single mothers. Although male sexuality was
not so rigidly regulated, men’s behavior was also subject to strict
social norms. Fathering children out of wedlock, or abandoning
mothers and children, elicited extreme disapproval.
The 1960s sexual revolution and the rise of feminism fueled a
softening in these attitudes and a shift in expectations regard‐
ing work, sexuality, and family structure. These norm changes
have decisively influenced public views on welfare and have
shaped the course of welfare reform. The critical development
relevant to this Essay is that the liberationist values of the 1960s
took hold in the mainstream. In the decades since the 1960s,
unconventional families—including single‐parent families—have
become more prevalent and socially acceptable, and extramarital
sexual activity is now commonplace.69 Persons deviating from
conventional norms are no longer uniformly viewed as unde‐
serving of public assistance. In addition, a central tenet of the
sexual revolution has been a reluctance to judge others’ choices
in areas related to sexuality and family structure. This shift in
mainstream morality has undermined the public’s willingness
to use law and policy to hold people to traditional standards of
sexual conduct.
In sum, the past forty years have witnessed a pronounced sea
change in the expectations for personal behaviors that bear on
dependency. These developments, however, have not caused the
public to abandon the distinction between the deserving and
undeserving poor. Rather, they have resulted in a reassessment
of who falls within those categories. To be sure, there remains
uncertainty and ambivalence on issues of sexual conduct rele‐
vant to public aid programs. Is having a child out of wedlock a
choice for which mothers (and fathers) should be held respon‐
sible, or is it something that women do not really control? Is a
woman’s decision to marry or have a child one on which the
government should have no opinion and take no position, or
should the government be able to take those decisions into ac‐
count, especially when spending taxpayers’ money? There is
68. For a discussion of early efforts to prevent recipients from becoming eco‐
nomically dependent on AFDC, see Berrick, supra note 31, at 260–62.
69. See Malin, supra note 67, at 133 (“The percentage of families headed by single
parents more than doubled from 1970, reaching twenty‐seven percent in 1993.”).
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now less unanimity on these questions, with views running the
gamut. Nonetheless, the number of people taking a hard line is
unquestionably in decline. The upshot is that public opinion is
now more closely in sync with the reasoning and outcomes of
cases like King v. Smith, Lewis v. Martin, and United States De‐
partment of Agriculture v. Moreno.
Attitudes have also decisively changed on the question of
work, with the voting public less tolerant of single mothers’
economic dependency and more willing than in past decades
to hold poor women responsible for their own support. Al‐
though some still embrace men’s traditional duties to marry
and provide for their children, there is less consensus on this
point, with the result that much of the burden of supporting
extramarital children has effectively been transferred to the
mothers themselves.70 One key impetus for this change is that a
growing number of women have joined the workforce.71 Pro‐
ponents of work requirements point out that mothers across
the board now work. They ask why poor women should be dif‐
ferent. Even if many are unable to achieve complete economic
independence, they can at least contribute reasonable efforts to‐
ward their own support.72 What Noah Zatz has termed the
“class parity” argument—the position that mothers on welfare,
like other women in the post‐feminist world, should no longer
automatically expect to stay home and be supported by others—
has gained a decisive influence in the welfare policy world.73
The dramatic social developments just discussed prompt a
question: If the Supreme Court had never decided cases like
King, Lewis, and Moreno, would public assistance programs
have taken a different turn? Were these judicial decisions in‐
strumental in shaping the course of public welfare? Alterna‐
tively, did they affect the behavioral choices of welfare recipi‐
ents? Although it is impossible to give a definitive answer, the
situation suggests that these decisions were a modest influence.
70. For a discussion of the increased emphasis on personal responsibility, see
Berrick, supra note 31, at 272–74.
71. See Malin, supra note 67, at 133 (women in the work force increased by 200%
between 1950 and 1990).
72. For a more detailed discussion of the issue of self‐sufficiency, see Amy L.
Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 477 (2001); Wax, Social
Welfare, supra note 25; see also Noah Zatz, Revisiting the Class Parity Analysis of
Welfare Work Requirements (unpublished manuscript, on file with Author).
73. See Zatz, supra note 72.
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The post‐60s juggernaut was rolling, the family was weaken‐
ing, and the expectation of economic independence for women
was growing stronger. The courts did not foment these trends,
and they probably could not have stopped them. On this view,
the key welfare decisions were probably of minor importance.
They were an anticipation of things to come and, at most, has‐
tened the arrival of new social patterns. Broader cultural trends
were at least as significant as the decisions themselves.
Indeed, recent changes in sexuality and family structure have
been so powerful that efforts to slow or reverse these trends
have proven unsuccessful. It has now been twelve years since
the enactment of the TANF program. Although the key elements
of TANF are stringent work requirements and time limits for
receiving cash benefits, the preamble to the welfare reform stat‐
ute reveals that the drafters were more concerned with the disin‐
tegration of the family than with economic dependency.74 Pro‐
ponents of reform thought that work requirements, by making
welfare less attractive, would create strong incentives for
women to marry.75 The hope was that a surge in marriage
among poor women would generate a revival of the traditional
family. This hope was never realized. Although reform has
been successful in promoting employment among poor single
mothers, it has not achieved the stated goal of reversing the
decades‐long decline in the nuclear family for this group.76 For
the least skilled and educated segment of the population, the
family continues to deteriorate apace. Extramarital childbear‐
ing is ever more common and marriage increasingly rare, with
single‐parent families now the norm for low‐income women.77
The failure of welfare reform to slow these trends reveals that
family structure changes have now taken on a life of their own.
These developments have thus far resisted manipulation
through legal or policy instruments.

74. See Wax, The failure of welfare reform, supra note 30.
75. See Wax, supra note 7, at 588 (explaining that these hopes were unrealized be‐
cause work support programs continued effectively to subsidize all types of families).
76. See Philip K. Robins, Economic and Social Security and Substandard Working Con‐
ditions: The New World of Welfare, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 735, 735 (2003) (review‐
ing THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE (Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins, eds. 2001)).
77. For a more extensive discussion of this issue, see Wax, supra note 7, at 574–
75. See also Amy L. Wax, Too Few Good Men, 134 POL’Y REV. 69 (2006).
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The question of whether AFDC accelerated the decades‐long
disintegration of the family is highly controversial.78 We will
never really know whether judicially imposed leniency, as
mandated in cases like King v. Smith and Lewis v. Martin, con‐
tributed significantly to the nuclear family’s decline, or
whether poor families would be more cohesive today if those
cases had come out differently. But whether or not the courts
had much to do with weakening families in recent decades, the
evidence suggests that government programs and policies can‐
not do much to strengthen them.79 The deterioration of the fam‐
ily continues apace among the less advantaged members of our
society. Most likely, nothing short of a cultural revolution—
akin to the one this country experienced in the 1960s—will re‐
verse this trend.

78. See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950–1980,
at 124–34 (1984).
79. For a more extensive discussion of this issue, see Wax, supra note 7, at 587–88.

